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I. INTRODUCTION
[1]
Following the December 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, much has been written about the discovery of
electronically-stored information (“ESI”). However, as one court noted,
[v]ery little has been written . . . about what is required to
insure that ESI obtained during discovery is admissible into
evidence at trial . . . . This is unfortunate, because
considering the significant costs associated with discovery
of ESI, it makes little sense to go to all the bother and
expense to get electronic information only to have it
excluded from evidence or rejected from consideration
during summary judgment because the proponent cannot
lay a sufficient foundation to get it admitted.1
*

Principal, Odin, Feldman & Pittleman, P.C., Fairfax, Virginia. B.A., 1994, University
of Virginia; J.D., 1997, University of Richmond, T.C. Williams School of Law.
**

Associate, Odin, Feldman & Pittleman, P.C., Fairfax, Virginia. B.A., 2005, The
Pennsylvania State University; J.D., 2010, American University, Washington College of
Law.
1

Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 537-38 (D. Md. 2007).
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Most information is now communicated, generated, or stored
electronically.2 As Chief United States Magistrate Judge Grimm of the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland acknowledged in
Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Company, “[b]ecause it can be
expected that electronic evidence will constitute much, if not most, of the
evidence used in future motions practice or at trial, counsel should know
how to get it right on the first try.”3 This Article is intended to be an
overview of “how to get it right on the first try,” at least in federal court.4
The Article is roughly organized according to the Federal Rules of
Evidence, with examples of how those rules have been applied to
electronic evidence.
[2]
It is important to remember that there is nothing “magical” about
the admission of electronic evidence. The prevalence of electronic
evidence has required no substantial changes to the Federal Rules of
Evidence.5 In analyzing the admissibility of such evidence, it is often best
to treat it as originating from the most similar, non-electronic source as
thoughtful application of traditional evidentiary principles will nearly
always lead to the correct result.6 Thus, while electronic evidence may
present some unique challenges to admissibility and complicate matters of
establishing authenticity and foundation, it does not require the proponent
to discard his knowledge of traditional evidentiary principles or learn
anything truly new.

2

See Electronic Discovery in Litigation, INFOLOGY, 1, http://www.infology.net/
downloads/The%20Strategic%20Value%20of%20Electronic%20Discovery.pdf
(last
visited Jan. 10, 2011).
3

Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 585.

4

Id.

5

See Jonathan L. Moore, Moore on Upgrading the Federal Rules of Evidence to
Accommodate ESI, LEGAL INFORMATICS BLOG (June 11, 2010, 9:04 PM),
http://legalinformatics.wordpress.com/2010/06/11/moore-on-upgrading-the-federal-rulesof-evidence-to-accommodate-esi/.
6

See Sarah Van Deusen Phillips, The Documentalist, Legal Considerations for
Electronic Evidence, Part 2: Relevance and Authenticity, WORD PRESS (Apr. 26, 2010),
http://crlgrn.wordpress.com/2010/04/.
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II. TYPES OF ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE AND THE ANALYTICAL
FRAMEWORK FOR ADMISSION
[3]
Electronically stored information that is admitted as evidence at a
trial or hearing is electronic evidence.7 It may include: electronic
communications, such as e-mails, text messages, and chat room
communications; digital photographs; website content, including social
media postings; computer-generated data; and computer-stored records.8
[4]
The seminal decision addressing the admissibility of electronic
evidence is Judge Grimm’s 51-page opinion in Lorraine v. Markel
American Insurance Company, which reads as a comprehensive guide to
the admission of electronic evidence.9 In Lorraine, Judge Grimm
describes a decision model for addressing the admission of electronic
evidence, which, unsurprisingly, is nearly identical to the one many
proponents apply to the admission of more traditional forms of evidence.10
[5]
The Lorraine model suggests that the proponent of electronic
evidence focus first on relevance, asking whether the electronic evidence
has any tendency to make some fact that is of consequence to the litigation
more or less probable than it would be otherwise.11 Second, the proponent
should address authenticity, asking if he can present evidence
demonstrating that the electronic evidence is what it purports to be.12
Third, the proponent must address any hearsay concerns associated with
7

See Christine Sgarlata Chung & David J. Byer, The Electronic Paper Trail: Evidentiary
Obstacles to Discovery and Admission of Electronic Evidence, 4 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
5, 9 (1998), available at https://www.bu.edu/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/
scitech/volume4/4jstl05.pdf.
8

See Michael D. Gifford, Admitting Electronic Evidence in Federal Court: I’ve Got All
This Evidence Data – Now What Do I Do With It?, AM. B. ASS’N, 2 (2008),
http://www.abanet.org/labor/basics/elist/papers/lied.pdf.
9

See generally Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. 534.

10

Compare Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 537-38, with Gifford, supra note 8, at 4.

11

See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 540 (citing FED. R. EVID. 401).

12

See id. at 541-42.
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the electronic evidence, asking if it is a statement by the declarant, other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered for the truth of the matter asserted, and, if the electronic
information is hearsay, whether an exclusion or exception to the hearsay
rule applies.13 Fourth, the proponent must address the application of the
original documents rule.14 Fifth, and finally, the proponent should
consider “whether the probative value of the [electronic] evidence is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice[,]” confusion,
or waste of time.15 Careful consideration of these traditional evidentiary
principles will permit a proponent to successfully admit electronic
evidence.
III. RELEVANCE CONSIDERATIONS
A. Logical Relevance
[6]
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, relevant evidence is
generally admissible, and irrelevant evidence is not.16 “Relevant evidence”
is defined as evidence that has “any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”17 Rules
401 and 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence address this fundamental
question of “logical relevance.”18
13

See id. at 562-63.

14

See id. at 576.

15

See id. at 583. On this last consideration, we will depart from Judge Grimm’s model
and instead address logical relevance (the first consideration in the Lorraine model)
together with pragmatic relevance (the fifth and final consideration in the Lorraine
model).
16

FED. R. EVID. 402 (“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided
by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by [the Federal Rules of
Evidence], or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority.”).
17

FED. R. EVID. 401 (emphasis added). This question is “different from whether
evidence is sufficient to prove a point.” Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 541 (emphasis omitted).
18

See FED. R. EVID. 401; FED. R. EVID. 402.
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[7]
As one might expect, demonstrating that evidence has any
tendency to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to adjudication of
the action is not particularly difficult.19 The Federal Rules’ logical
relevance test is quite yielding, particularly in light of the fact that a
court’s determination of logical relevance is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard.20 This test is applied to electronic evidence in the
same way that it is applied to more traditional forms of evidence.21 To
those accustomed to applying the Federal Rules’ logical relevance test to
more traditional forms of evidence, the test’s application to electronic
evidence is fairly intuitive; it seems that, even under the view that
electronic evidence is fundamentally strange or “magical,” logical
relevance is logical relevance.
B. Pragmatic Relevance
[8]
Even logically relevant evidence may be held inadmissible “if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.”22 Under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, this test of “pragmatic relevance” focuses only on unfair
19

See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 541 (“Establishing that ESI has some relevance generally
is not hard for counsel.”).
20

See United States v. Becton, 601 F.3d 588, 594 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (stating that
determinations of the district courts concerning relevancy are reviewed for an abuse of
discretion); United States v. Alvarez, 358 F.3d 1194, 1205 (9th Cir. 2004)
(acknowledging the wide discretion afforded to trial judges in determining whether
evidence is relevant and noting that a reviewing court will only consider “whether the
decision was based on relevant factors and whether there was ‘a clear error of
judgment.’”) (quoting United States v. Soulard, 730 F.2d 1292, 1296 (9th Cir. 1984).
21

Compare Dickens v. State, 927 A.2d 32, 38 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007) (holding that
threatening text messages from a husband to his wife in the months preceding her murder
were relevant to show that the husband’s decision to murder his wife was deliberate and
premeditated), with State v. Corwin, 295 S.W.3d 572, 579 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (holding
that a rape victim’s Facebook postings, which showed her dancing and drinking with men
other than the accused rapist, were not relevant).
22

FED. R. EVID. 403.

5
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prejudice, since all evidence is prejudicial.23 “‘Unfair prejudice’ . . .
means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis,
commonly, though not necessarily an emotional one.”24
[9]
Like logical relevance, the Federal Rules’ test for pragmatic
relevance is applied to electronic evidence in the same way it is applied to
more traditional forms of evidence.25 A court is most likely to invoke
Rule 403 to exclude otherwise relevant electronic evidence where such
evidence: (1) “contain[s] offensive or highly derogatory language that
may provoke an emotional response;”26 (2) consists of computer
animations or simulations where “there is a substantial risk that the jury
may mistake them for the actual events [at issue] in the litigation;”27 (3)
consists “of summaries of voluminous electronic writings, recordings or

23

Indeed, the purpose of evidence is to prejudice the opposing party. United States v.
Clark, 577 F.3d 273, 288 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting that, for purposes of analyzing evidence
under Rule 403, “it is not enough to simply show that the evidence is prejudicial as
virtually all evidence is prejudicial or it is not material”) (quoting United States v. Rocha
916 F.2d 219, 239 (5th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Dollar v. Long
Mfg., N.C., Inc., 561 F.2d 613, 618 (5th Cir. 1977) (“Of course, ‘unfair prejudice’ as
used in Rule 403 is not to be equated with testimony simply adverse to the opposing
party. Virtually all evidence is prejudicial or it isn’t material. The prejudice must be
‘unfair.’”).
24

FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note.

25

See, e.g., Monotype Corp. v. Int’l Typeface Corp., 43 F.3d 443, 449-50 (9th Cir. 1994)
(affirming a trial court’s decision to exclude e-mails that would have been overly
prejudicial to the opposing party and would have confused the jury).
26

Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 584 (D. Md. 2007) (citation omitted)
(discussing electronic evidence); see also Monotype, 43 F.3d at 450 (holding that a
district court did not err in excluding e-mails under Rule 403 because they were
derogatory in nature and lacked probative value).
27

Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 584 (citation omitted) (discussing electronic evidence); see
also State v. Farner, 66 S.W.3d 188, 210 (Tenn. 2002) (excluding an animation under
Tennessee’s counterpart to Rule 403 because the animation was based upon inaccurate
and incomplete information and depicted the accident a total of fifteen times, which the
court suggested was unduly cumulative).

6
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photographs under Rule 1006;”28 or (4) is potentially unreliable or
inaccurate.29
IV. AUTHENTICATION
A. Requirement of Authentication of Electronic Evidence
[10] Before being admitted, evidence must be authenticated – that is,
the proponent of the evidence must make a showing sufficient to support a
finding that the evidence is what it purports to be.30 A “[c]ourt need not
find that the evidence is necessarily what the proponent claims, but only
that there is sufficient evidence that the jury ultimately might do so.”31
[11]

As Judge Grimm noted in Lorraine:
[C]ounsel often fail to meet even this minimal
showing when attempting to introduce ESI, which
underscores the need to pay careful attention to this
requirement. Indeed, the inability to get evidence admitted
because of a failure to authenticate it almost always is a
self-inflicted injury which can be avoided by thoughtful
advance preparation.32

Due to the common perception that electronic records may be readily
altered to appear to be something they are not,33 “[a]uthenticity is often the
28

Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 584 (citation omitted) (discussing electronic evidence).

29

See id. (citation omitted) (discussing electronic evidence); Farner, 66 S.W.3d at 210
(excluding an animation of a car accident where the depiction was inconsistent with
testimony regarding the speed of the vehicle and thus likely to be inaccurate).
30

See FED. R. EVID. 901.

31

Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 542 (quoting United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 38
(D.D.C. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
32

Id. at 542.

33

See Jerold S. Solovy & Robert L. Byman, Don’t Let Your E-Evidence Get Trashed,
LAW TECHNOLOGY NEWS (June 11, 2007), http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/
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[12] The proponent of electronic evidence often has to swim against the
tide of a judiciary that is highly skeptical of such evidence.35 Perhaps
nowhere is such skepticism better articulated than in a decade-old decision
from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
addressing the admissibility of information discovered on the Internet:
While some look to the Internet as an innovative vehicle for
communication, the Court continues to warily and wearily
view it largely as one large catalyst for rumor, innuendo,
and misinformation. So as to not mince words, the Court
reiterates that this so-called Web provides no way of
verifying the authenticity of the alleged contentions that
Plaintiff wishes to rely upon in his Response to
Defendant’s Motion. There is no way Plaintiff can
overcome the presumption that the information he
discovered on the Internet is inherently untrustworthy.
Anyone can put anything on the Internet. No web-site is
monitored for accuracy and nothing contained therein is
under oath or even subject to independent verification
absent underlying documentation. Moreover, the Court
holds no illusions that hackers can adulterate the content on
any web-site from any location at any time. For these
reasons, any evidence procured off the Internet is adequate

PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1181293533711 (“[A]ltering an e-mail takes nothing more than
an impure heart and a keystroke.”); Gifford, supra note 8, at 3 (“In the era when paper
statements were dropped into a manila file until needed again, alteration or tampering
was relatively easy to detect. . . . [W]ith paperless data greater attention must be given to
the foundation necessary to establish the security of stored data.”).
34

Keiko L. Sugisaka, Admissibility of E-Evidence in Minnesota: New Problems or
Evidence as Usual? 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1453, 1459 (2009).
35

See Steven Goode, The Admissibility of Electronic Evidence, 29 REV. LITIG. 1, 2
(2009).

8
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for almost nothing, even under the most liberal
interpretation of the hearsay exception rules . . . .36
[13] The Southern District of Texas’s early distrust of electronic
evidence has been shared, and discussed with equal force, by Federal
Courts across the country.37 Though this distrust is often applied to
evidence obtained from the Internet, it is equally apparent where courts
address the admissibility of e-mail and other electronic evidence.38
[14] However, some courts seem less willing to dismiss electronic
evidence based on the mere fact that such evidence is susceptible to
alteration.39 Indeed, some courts will admit, for example, e-mails, after a
threshold showing of authenticity and then leave the determination of
whether thee-mails were altered for the jury.40
B. Authenticating Evidence by Extrinsic Evidence
[15] Rule 901(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence sets forth a nonexclusive list identifying ten ways extrinsic evidence may authenticate
36

St. Clair v. Johnny’s Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 774-75 (S.D. Tex.
1999) (holding that “voodoo information taken from the Internet” was insufficient to
withstand a motion to dismiss).
37

See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 2000) (expressing
skepticism over the admissibility of Internet web postings as a business record,
particularly in light of the fact that the proponent presented no evidence that the ISP
monitored the contents of the website); see also Wady v. Provident Life & Accident Ins.
Co., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1064 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (quoting the St. Clair court and
acknowledging that information retrieved from the Internet is inherently unreliable and
easily distorted).
38

See Leah Voigt Romano, Developments in the Law: Electronic Discovery; VI:
Electronic Evidence and the Federal Rules, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1745, 1801 (2005).
39

See, e.g., United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 41 (D.D.C. 2006) (“The
possibility of alteration does not and cannot be the basis for excluding e-mails as
unidentified or unauthenticated as a matter of course, any more than it can be the
rationale for excluding paper documents (and copies of those documents).”).
40

See id.

9
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evidence for admission.41 Though this list was prepared with more
traditional forms of evidence in mind, most of the listed methods of
authentication are easily applied to electronic evidence.42
1. Testimony of a Witness with Knowledge
[16] Under Rule 901(b)(1), a proponent may authenticate evidence
through testimony that the evidence “is what it is claimed to be.”43 For
non-electronic documents, the witness providing such testimony may be
the person who drafted the document or who is responsible for
maintaining the record.44 For electronic evidence, the witness providing
such testimony may be the person who created the electronic document or
maintains the evidence in its electronic form.45
[17] Generally, a witness authenticating electronic evidence must
“provide factual specificity about the process by which the electronically
stored information is created, acquired, maintained, and preserved without
alteration or change, or the process by which it is produced if the result of
a system or process that does so.”46 Failure to provide such testimony
may result in the subject electronic evidence being held to be
inadmissible.47
41

See FED. R. EVID. 901(b).

42

Obviously, the methods described in FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(2) (Nonexpert Opinion on
Handwriting), FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(5) (Voice Identification), and FED. R. EVID.
901(b)(6) (Telephone Conversations) do not typically apply to electronic evidence. The
remaining methods do.
43

FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1).

44

See United States v. Locke, 425 F.2d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding that records
were properly authenticated through the testimony of the custodian of records).
45

See United States v. Barlow, 568 F.3d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that a chat log
was properly authenticated by the testimony of a witness who participated in, and thus
created, the chat).
46

Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 545 (D. Md. 2007).

47

See, e.g., Am. Express Travel Related Servs. v. Vinhnee (In re Vee Vinhnee), 336 B.R.
437, 447 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (holding that computer records were not properly

10
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2. Comparison by Trier or Expert Witness
[18] Under Rule 901(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, either an
expert witness or the trier of fact may authenticate evidence by comparing
it to properly authenticated specimens.48 While this method was originally
intended to authenticate handwriting or signatures,49 it has recently been
used to authenticate electronic communications as well.50
3. Distinctive Characteristics and the Like
[19] Under Rule 901(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a party
may authenticate evidence using circumstantial evidence in conjunction
with the “[a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other
distinctive characteristics” of the evidence.51 This is one of the most
common methods of authenticating evidence.52
[20] Where a witness testifies that an e-mail or text message originated
from the known e-mail address or screen name of another person, courts
will often find that the e-mail or text message is an authentic
communication from the purported sender.53 This is particularly true
authenticated where the authenticating witness’ testimony was vague, unpersuasive, and
conclusory, and demonstrated a lack of knowledge regarding the relevant hardware and
software).
48

FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(3).

49

Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 546 (citing FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(3) advisory committee’s
note).
50

See, e.g., United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 40 (D.D.C. 2006) (permitting
the authentication of e-mails by comparison to other e-mails already authenticated under
Federal Rule 901(b)(4)).
51

FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4).

52

Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 546.

53

See, e.g., People v. Pierre, 838 N.Y.S.2d 546, 548-49 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (holding,
under New York’s adaptation of Rule 901(b)(3), that an instant message was properly
authenticated as a communication from the defendant after “[t]he accomplice witness . . .
testified to defendant’s [instant messenger] screen name. . . . [and] that she sent an instant

11
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where the content of the e-mail or text message reveals additional indicia
of authenticity.54
[21] Authenticating other electronic evidence under Rule 901(b)(4) may
involve the use of “hash values” or “metadata.”55 A hash value is “[a]
unique numerical identifier that can be assigned to a file, a group of files,
or a portion of a file, based on a standard mathematical algorithm applied
to the characteristics of the data set.”56 An electronic document’s hash
value may constitute a distinguishing trait permitting authentication under
Federal Rule 901(b)(4).57
[22] Metadata is “information describing the history, tracking, or
management of an electronic document.”58 This “data about data”
pertaining to the evidence in question may constitute a distinctive
characteristic permitting authentication under Rule 901(b)(4).59 However,
this method of authentication is not entirely foolproof; network

message to that screen name, and received a reply, the content of which made no sense
unless it was sent by defendant [and] there was no evidence that anyone had a motive, or
opportunity, to impersonate defendant by using his screen name.”); see also Simon v.
State, 279 Ga. App. 844, 847 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (holding, under Georgia’s version of
Rule 901(b)(3), that e-mail correspondence between the defendant and his minor victim
was properly authenticated “where . . . the witness testified that the [e-mails] accurately
reflect[ed] the exchange between the parties, the witness communicated with the
defendant at his known e-mail address,” and the e-mail from the defendant referenced the
defendant’s nickname).
54

See Simon, 279 Ga. App. at 847.

55

See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 546-47 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
56

Id. (quoting FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANAGING DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONIC
INFORMATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 24 (2007)).
57

Id. at 547.

58

Id. (quoting Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 646 (D. Kan.
2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
59

Id. at 547-48 (quoting Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 646) (internal quotation marks omitted).

12
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administrators and other users on the same network may access or alter
electronic files stored on network computers.60
4. Public Records or Reports
[23] Under Rule 901(b)(7) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a
document may be authenticated by “[e]vidence that a writing authorized
by law to be recorded or filed and in fact recorded or filed in a public
office, or a purported public record, report, statement, or data compilation,
in any form, is from the public office where items of this nature are
kept.”61 “[T]he ‘proponent of the evidence need only show that the office
from which the records were taken is the legal custodian of the records;’”
which may be accomplished through “‘[t]he testimony of an officer who is
authorized to attest to custodianship,’” or through “‘[a] certificate of
authenticity from the public office’” authorized to maintain the records.62
Concerns about the accuracy of such evidence go to the weight of that
evidence, not its admissibility.63
5. Ancient Documents
[24] Ancient documents may be authenticated under Rule 901(b)(8) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence if the document “(A) is in such condition as
to create no suspicion concerning its authenticity, (B) was in a place where
it, if authentic, would likely be, and (C) has been in existence 20 years or

60

Id. at 548 (citing JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 900.01 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997)).
61

FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(7).

62

See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 548 (quoting JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 901.10 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed.,
Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997)).
63

See United States v. Meienberg, 263 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Catabran, 836 F.2d 453, 458 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Any question as to the accuracy of the
printouts, whether resulting from incorrect data entry or the operation of the computer
program, as with inaccuracies in any other type of business records, would have affected
only the weight of the printouts, not their admissibility.”).
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more at the time it is offered.”64 The Sixth Circuit has noted that despite
the Rule’s mandate “that the document be free of suspicion . . . suspicion
goes not to the content of the document, but rather to whether the
document is what it purports to be.”65 The theory behind this method is
that, because of the age of the document, its author or creator is likely
unavailable to testify regarding its authenticity; thus, courts must look to
circumstantial evidence to guarantee the genuineness of the document.66
[25] This method of authentication is also significant in that it can
qualify an exhibit under a corresponding hearsay exception, so that the
exhibit may then be admitted for the truth of its contents.67 Under Rule
803(16) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, “[s]tatements in a document in
existence twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established”
may be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule.68 Given the similar
requirements of Rules 901(b)(8) and 803(16), courts frequently find that
once a document is authenticated under 901(b)(8), it automatically
qualifies under 803(16).69 The rationale behind this exception is that,
because the document was created long before the controversy arose, it is
less likely that the document was fabricated or altered for purposes of the
present litigation.70
64

FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(8).

65

United States v. Mandycz, 447 F.3d 951, 966 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v.
Demjanjuk, 367 F.3d 623, 631 (6th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
66

See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 225 (Kenneth S. Broud ed., 6th ed. 2006) (listing
facts that support the genuineness of a document, such as “unsuspicious appearance,
emergence from natural custody, prompt recording, and, in the case of a deed or will,
possession taken under the instrument.”).
67

Fagiola v. Nat’l Gypsum Co. AC & S., 906 F.2d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 1990).

68

FED. R. EVID. 803(16).

69

See Fagiola, 906 F.2d at 58.

70

See Columbia First Bank, FSB v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 333, 336 (Fed. Cl. 2003).
The court noted the advisory committee’s observation that “age affords assurance that the
writing antedates the present controversy.” Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 803(16) advisory
committee’s note).
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[26] While 901(b)(8) has not been widely used to authenticate
electronic evidence, the advisory committee notes make clear that the Rule
applies to electronically-stored data.71 The committee explains that “[t]his
expansion is necessary in view of the widespread use of methods of
storing data in forms other than conventional written records.”72
[27] This inclusion of electronically stored data may become more
significant in the coming years, as the twenty-year mark begins to reach
back to a period when electronic data was becoming more pervasive.
However, it is uncertain how courts will treat ‘ancient electronic’ evidence
given the requirement under 901(b)(8) that the evidence be in a condition
that creates “no suspicion concerning its authenticity.”73
6. Process or System
[28] Under Rule 901(b)(9) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a
document may be authenticated by “[e]vidence describing a process or
system used to produce a result and showing that the process or system
produces an accurate result.”74 This method is often used to authenticate
evidence generated by, or stored on, a computer.75
[29] One court has articulated an 11-step process for authenticating
computer-generated or stored records.76 The court found that to
authenticate such records, a proponent must establish that:
(1) The business uses a computer.
(2) The computer is reliable.
71

FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(8) advisory committee’s note.

72

Id.

73

See generally FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(8).

74

FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9).

75

See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9) advisory committee’s note.

76

See In re Vee Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 437, 446 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005).
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(3) The business has developed a procedure for inserting
data into the computer.
(4) The procedure has built-in safeguards to ensure
accuracy and identify errors.
(5) The business keeps the computer in a good state of
repair.
(6) The witness had the computer readout certain data.
(7) The witness used the proper procedures to obtain the
readout.
(8) The computer was in working order at the time the
witness obtained the readout.
(9) The witness recognizes the exhibit as the readout.
(10) The witness explains how he or she recognizes the
readout.
(11) If the readout contains strange symbols or terms, the
witness explains the meaning of the symbols or terms for
the trier of fact.77
C. Self-Authenticating Documents
[30] The Federal Rules of Evidence also identify a dozen categories of
evidence that may be authenticated without extrinsic evidence.78 Each of
these categories provides an efficient method for authenticating evidence,
but courts have identified three that are particularly relevant in the
electronic evidence context.79
1. Official Publications
[31] “Books, pamphlets, or other publications purporting to be issued
by public authority” are self-authenticating under Rule 902(5) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.80 Thus, an e-mail, newsletter, or website
77

Id.

78

See FED. R. EVID. 902.

79

See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 551 (D. Md. 2007).

80

FED. R. EVID. 902(5).
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published by a public authority can be self-authenticating but the
proponent of such evidence might also need to demonstrate that such a
document satisfies the public record hearsay exception set forth in Rule
803(8).81
2. Trade Inscriptions and the Like
[32] Evidence may be authenticated by “[i]nscriptions, signs, tags, or
labels purporting to have been affixed in the course of business and
indicating ownership, control, or origin.”82
Many business
communications, such as e-mails, “‘contain information showing the
origin of the transmission and identifying the employer-company’”
meaning “‘[t]he identification marker alone may be sufficient to
authenticate an e-mail under Rule 902(7).’”83
3. Certified Domestic Records of Regularly Conducted Activity
[33] Rule 902(11) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides a method
of self-authentication for records of regularly conducted activity.84 This
method mirrors the requirements of the business records exception to the
hearsay rule; therefore, courts often analyze it in conjunction with that
exception.85 The Rule provides that extrinsic evidence of authenticity is
not required for admissibility if the evidence is an “original or a duplicate
81

See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 551.

82

FED. R. EVID. 902(7).

83

Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 551-52 (citing JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 900.07(3)(c) (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew
Bender 2d ed. 1997)).
84

See FED. R. EVID. 902(11).

85

See DirecTV, Inc. v. Murray, 307 F. Supp. 2d 764, 772 (D.S.C. 2004) (analyzing the
admissibility of e-mails under Rules 902(11) and 803(6) and noting that the analyses
under both rules “are necessarily intertwined”); see also Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Tech.
AG, 348 F. Supp. 2d 698, 701 (E.D. Va. 2004) (“[T]he most appropriate way to view
Rule 902(11) is as the functional equivalent of testimony offered to authenticate a
business record tendered under Rule 803(6).”).
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of a domestic record of regularly conducted activity that would be
admissible under Rule 803(6).”86 However, to be self-authenticating the
record must be:
accompanied by a written declaration of its custodian or other
qualified person . . . certifying that the record (A) was made at or
near the time of the occurrence of the matters set forth by . . . a
person with knowledge of those matters; (B) was kept in the course
of the regularly conducted activity; and (C) was made . . . as a
regular practice.87
[34] To properly authenticate, the proponent must show that the
custodian of the records is “not only . . . familiar with the maintenance of
the records, but also with how they are created.”88 Furthermore, the
record must be made pursuant to established procedures and must be kept
as a regular practice by the business entity, much like the business records
exception.89
[35] This method of self-authentication is particularly important to
electronic evidence in light of the fact that most business records today are
stored in electronic format.90 Thus, not only will a proper declaration selfauthenticate electronic evidence, but the content of the evidence may be

86

FED. R. EVID. 902(11).

87

Id.

88

Rambus, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 703 (noting that the bar for qualifying a witness as the
custodian of records is low).
89

See id. at 704-05 (“It is not enough that a particular employee regularly makes and
keeps the records as his or her own regular practice because it must be the regular
practice of the business . . . to make and keep the record at issue.”).
90

See, e.g., DirecTV, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 772 (finding that an electronic dealer’s e-mails
were properly self-authenticated under Rule 902(11) in light of the custodian of records’
testimony that the e-mail records were kept in the normal course of business, were made
at or near the time the events occurred, and that it was the custom of the business to
regularly record orders by e-mail and keep those e-mails as records of such orders).
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admitted for its truth because it qualifies under the business records
exception to the hearsay rule.91
D. Authentication of Certain Types of Electronic Evidence
1. E-mails and Text Messages
[36] In modern litigation, it is rare when a case does not involve some
communication by e-mail or text message.92 Such a communication is
easily authenticated if the proponent of the communication can secure the
admission of the author or sender of the communication that he drafted or
sent the communication.93 Additionally, a recipient, 94 or non-recipient
with knowledge that the communication was sent, 95 may authenticate an
e-mail or text message. Also, a witness with knowledge of how the
responsible Internet service providers or wireless telephone carriers sent
91

See id.

92

See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 554 (D. Md. 2007) (“There is no
form of ESI more ubiquitous than e-mail.”).
93

See Talada v. City of Martinez, 656 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1158 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (finding
that an e-mail had been properly authenticated by testimony from the sender, and that
separate e-mails were also properly authenticated by a declaration from the recipient of
the e-mails that they were accurate and true copies of the e-mails).
94

In People v. Brown, a California court held that text messages from a witness’ cellular
telephone were properly authenticated in a criminal matter where the witness testified
that the messages came from the defendant and were “signed” with the defendant’s name.
People v. Brown, No. A122791, 2009 WL 1878704, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. June 30, 2009).
The prosecution introduced the messages into evidence by introducing the cellular
telephone as an exhibit and having the witness identify the telephone and read the
messages from the telephone aloud. Id. at *3.
95

In Dickens v. State, a Maryland court held that the testimony of a victim’s mother
regarding text messages sent to the victim from the victim’s husband before she was
murdered was sufficient to authenticate those messages under Maryland Rule 5-901(b),
Maryland’s equivalent to Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b). Dickens v. State, 927 A.2d
32, 36-37 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007). The court also considered circumstantial evidence
to corroborate the mother’s testimony including the fact that the telephone was found
near a home the defendant had visited shortly after the shooting and told residents that
“he had done something to his girlfriend.” Id. at 36 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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and received an e-mail or text message, and how such messages are stored
and retrieved, may authenticate such messages.96
The threshold
determination for authentication will often vary with the piece of evidence
and the court the evidence is before; however, the Southern District of
New York characterized this threshold requirement as “relatively low,”
and held that any remaining issues concerning authenticity should go to
the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.97
[37] Comparing an e-mail or a text message with other e-mails or text
messages already authenticated may serve to authenticate the e-mail or
text message at issue.98 This method is particularly useful in cases where
the sender/recipient’s e-mail address does not bear any indicia of
identification.99 For example, the e-mail address “joe.smith@doj.gov,”
indicates that the address most likely belongs to Joe Smith, who
presumably
works
for
the
Department
of
Justice.100
“MerrittDC@aol.com” does not contain the same obvious identifiers, but
comparing an e-mail from “MerrittDC@aol.com” with a previous e-mail
from the same address, which has already been independently and
properly authenticated, will authenticate the latter e-mail, even though it
does not contain the same information which authenticated the earlier email.101
2. Chat Room Communications
[38] A proponent may authenticate chat room communications by
demonstrating that: (1) the person alleged to be the sender had access to
96

See State v. Taylor, 632 S.E.2d 218, 230 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).

97

See Bazak Int’l Corp. v. Tarrant Apparel Grp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 377, 391-92 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
98

See United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 40 (D.D.C. 2006).

99

See, e.g., id.

100

See id.

101

See id. at 40-41 (comparing an e-mail from “MerrittDC@aol.com” with a previously
authenticated e-mail and finding the subsequent e-mail properly authenticated).
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the computer from which the chats were conducted; (2) the chats in
question were conducted at the same time as chats the defendant admitted
to conducting; (3) the chats were conducted using a screen name created
by the defendant; and (4) the content of the chats was similar to chats the
defendant admitted to conducting.102 Additionally, a proponent seeking to
admit transcripts of chat room dialogue must ensure that the transcripts
accurately reflect the conversation.103 Cutting and pasting portions of the
chat in a way that alters the context of the communication or that fails to
preserve the temporal integrity of the chat (for example, a chat room post
time-stamped at 1:00 p.m., followed by a chat room post time-stamped at
12:45 p.m.), may raise suspicion and prevent such transcripts from being
properly authenticated.104
[39] An even greater challenge in admitting chat room transcripts is
proving the identity of the participants.105 With no face-to-face interaction
and screen names that often give no indication of the user’s real name,
identifying the parties to the conversation is often a difficult hurdle to
overcome.106 To authenticate chat room transcripts, parties often use
circumstantial evidence, such as a witness testifying that she had
previously communicated with a certain screen name, that the responses
from the screen name would have not made sense were they not from a
particular person, and that no one else had a motive to impersonate that
particular person.107
102

See United States v. Zahursky, 580 F.3d 515, 524 (7th Cir. 2009).

103

See United States v. Jackson, 488 F. Supp. 2d 866, 871 (D. Neb. 2007).

104

See id. at 870-71 (finding that a Microsoft Word document containing cut-and-paste
portions of an online chat was not properly authenticated because there were several
instances of missing information, and some of the timing sequences were not in order).
105

See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 855 (1997) (discussing the
difficulty of determining the identity of chat room participants).
106

See id. at 890.

107

See People v. Pierre, 838 N.Y.S.2d 546, 548-49 (N.Y App. Div. 2007) (finding that a
chat room conversation was properly authenticated through circumstantial evidence even
though the witness did not save the conversation and no printable version was available
to the court); In re F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 95-96 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (considering
circumstantial evidence in admitting Instant Message chats).
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3. Websites
[40] Website authentication raises three distinct issues: “(1) What was
actually on the website? (2) Does the exhibit or testimony accurately
reflect it? (3) If so, is it attributable to the owner of the site?”108 To
address these questions, a proponent must often provide a witness with
personal knowledge of the website who can testify “‘that the printout
accurately reflects the content of the page and the image of the page on the
computer at which the printout was made.’”109
[41] A proponent also may authenticate a website under Rule 901(b)(4)
when the printout contains distinctive characteristics that, combined with
circumstantial evidence, show that the printout is what it purports to be.110
While a highly fact-specific inquiry, the level of scrutiny applied to
website printouts will often vary according to the particular website.111
For example, current printouts from reputable business sites, such as
bankofamerica.com or verizon.com, are less likely to be subject to the
same scrutiny as the online-encyclopedia Wikipedia, a blog, or another
website where content is easily manipulated.112 Additional concerns may

108

Goode, supra note 35 at 11.

109

See Toytrackerz LLC v. Koehler, No. 08-2297-GLR, 2009 WL 2591329, at *6 (D.
Kan. Aug. 21, 2009) (quoting Nightlight Sys., Inc. v. Nitelites Franchise Sys., Inc., 2007
WL 4563875, at *6 (N.D. Ga. May 11, 2007)) (finding that the proponent of various
website printouts failed to authenticate them because there was no indication as to who
retrieved the printout, when and how the pages were printed, or on what basis the
printouts accurately reflected the website on a particular date); Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1154 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that a
plaintiff properly authenticated printouts from a website where he submitted declarations
sufficient to show that the pictures were what they purported to be).
110

See Goode, supra note 35, at 29.

111

See id.

112

See id.
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be raised regarding an author’s identity, especially in the context of
defamatory postings on blogs or other websites.113
[42] Even more dubious is content obtained from older versions of a
website. If such content has not been archived by the operator of the
website, the proponent may be forced to seek the admission of the website
content as archived by the Internet Archive Company at
http://www.archive.org.114 Authentication of such evidence may be
accomplished through testimony or affidavit that the Internet Archive
Company retrieved copies of the website as it appeared on the dates in
question from its electronic archives.115 Though “the Internet Archive
does not fit neatly into any of the non-exhaustive examples listed in Rule
901” and “is a relatively new source for archiving websites,” at least one
district court has held that, absent evidence that the Internet Archive is
biased or unreliable, or evidence contesting the veracity of the proposed
exhibit, such testimony or affidavit is sufficient to satisfy the threshold
requirement for admissibility – that is, a prima facie showing of
genuineness.116 By contrast, printouts from official government websites
have been held to be self-authenticating under Rule 902(5) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, which provides that books, pamphlets, or other
publications purporting to be issued by public authority are selfauthenticating.117

113

See Wendler & Ezra, P.C. v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 521 F.3d 790, 791-92 (7th Cir.
2008) (holding that a plaintiff failed to link a defamatory post on a third party website to
the defendant).
114

See Telewizja Polska USA, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., No. 02 C 3293, 2004 WL
2367740, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2004).
115

See id.

116

Id.

117

Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. McPherson, No. C 06-4670 SBA, 2008 WL 4183981, at
*7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008) (holding that printouts from the California Secretary of State
website were self-authenticating under Rule 902(5)).
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4. Computer-Generated Records
[43] The authenticity of computer-generated records is generally shown
through the testimony of a witness with knowledge of how the records are
recorded, stored and maintained.118 However, given the wide disparity
among courts concerning the admission of computer-generated records,
the difficulty in preparing such evidence is determining the level of
scrutiny the court will apply to the evidence when assessing its
authenticity.119
[44] Courts on one end of the spectrum will allow authentication of
computer-generated evidence by a person “who has knowledge of the
particular record system.”120 This camp does not require computer
programmers or experts to testify as to the accuracy and intricacies of the
particular computer program.121 Rather, the proponent is only held to the
standard of showing that the records were sufficiently precise and that the
company relied upon such records in its business practices.122
[45] On the other end of the spectrum, courts require a much more
rigorous process in order to make a sufficient showing that a computer-

118

See U-Haul Int'l Inc. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 576 F.3d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.
2009) (finding that computer-generated records were properly authenticated through
testimony “regarding the process of inputting data into the computer and the process of
querying the computer to compile the information”); see also Hardison v. Balboa Ins.
Co., 4 F. App'x 663, 669 (10th Cir. 2001) (permitting the authentication of computergenerated records through affidavits and verified answers to interrogatories).
119

See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 559 (D. Md. 2007) (advising
lawyers “to plan to authenticate the record by the most rigorous standard that may be
applied”).
120

See U-Haul, 576 F.3d at 1045 (quoting United States v. Miller, 771 F.2d 1219, 1237
(9th Cir. 1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
121

See id.

122

See id.
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generated record is what it purports to be.123 These courts require specific
testimony regarding not only the procedures for storing and maintaining
the data, but also concerning the functionality of the particular hardware
and software used to store, compute, and maintain the data.124 Because
the person inputting data is rarely familiar with the inner-workings of
computer hardware or software, the proponent of such evidence will often
need to retain an expert to explain these processes to the satisfaction of the
court.125
V. HEARSAY
A. Hearsay
[46] “‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.”126 In this context, “[a] ‘statement’ is (1) an oral or
written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct . . . intended . . . as an
assertion,”127 and “[a] ‘declarant’ is a person who makes a statement.”128
1. Statement
[47] Evidence that does not meet the definition of a “statement” under
the Federal Rules of Evidence is not hearsay.129 “[F]or verbal or
123

See In re Vee Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 437, 446 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (listing "built-in
safeguards to ensure accuracy and identify errors" as part of an eleven-step authentication
process).
124

See id. at 447 (noting that the witness’ testimony concerning American Express’
computer records was “vague, conclusory, and, in light of the assertion that ‘[t]here’s no
way that the computer changes numbers,’ unpersuasive”) (citation omitted).
125

See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 559 (D. Md. 2007).

126

FED. R. EVID. 801(c).

127

FED. R. EVID. 801(a).

128

FED. R. EVID. 801(b) (emphasis added).

129

See FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
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nonverbal conduct to fall within the definition of the hearsay rule as
defined under the Federal Rules of Evidence, it must be either an
expressly assertive written or spoken utterance, or nonverbal conduct
expressly intended to be an assertion – the federal rules appear to have
excluded from the definition of hearsay ‘implied assertions’ . . . .”130 An
example of this concept is the following: A man stepping outside and
opening his umbrella.131 The man did not intend to assert that it is raining
outside when he opened his umbrella, thus, his conduct was
nonassertive.132 Accordingly, a witness’s testimony that the man stepped
outside and opened his umbrella, offered to show that it was raining, is not
hearsay.133
2. Declarant
[48] To be hearsay, the statement must be made by a person, the
“declarant,” not an animal or machine.134 For example, when a dog
trained to detect illegal substances finds drugs in the trunk of a car,
hearsay is not an issue – the declarant is not a person.135 But when a nun
witnesses an accident and states what she saw, the dangers of faulty
memory, perception, and ambiguity remain, even though the nun is less
likely to lie about the events.136 When viewed across the range of dogs to
130

Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 563; see United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 44
(D.D.C. 2006) (explaining that an e-mail containing imperative statements is nonassertive verbal conduct and not hearsay).
131

See Paul S. Milich, Re-Examining Hearsay Under the Federal Rules: Some Method
for the Madness, 39 U. KAN. L. REV. 893, 903 (1991).
132

See id.

133

See id. (“Opening an umbrella normally is not intended to be an assertion about
anything, and, thus, such nonverbal conduct does not fall within the federal definition of
hearsay.”).
134

See FED. R. EVID. 801(c), see also John C. O’Brien, The Hearsay Within
Confrontation, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 501, 520 (2010).
135

See O’Brien, supra note 134.

136

PAUL R. RICE, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE: LAW AND PRACTICE 199-200 n.12 (2005).
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nuns, nothing to the left of dogs creates a hearsay problem.137 Thus,
machines, which are to the left of dogs, fall outside the scope of hearsay
“because the hearsay problems of perception, memory, sincerity and
ambiguity have either been addressed or eliminated.”138
[49] In the context of electronic evidence, the concept of a declarant is
often tested in the consideration of computer-generated evidence.139 As
the court stated in Lorraine:
When an electronically generated record is entirely the
product of the functioning of a computerized system or
process, such as the “report” generated when a fax is sent
showing the number to which the fax was sent and the time
it was received, there is no “person” involved in the
creation of the record, and no “assertion” being made. For
that reason, the record is not a statement and cannot be
hearsay.140
3. Offered to Prove the Truth of the Matter Asserted
[50] If a statement is not offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, the statement is not hearsay.141 Thus, verbal acts and legally
operative facts, such as the fact that a contract was formed, are not hearsay

137

See id.

138

Id.

139

See generally Adam Wolfson, “Electronic Fingerprints”: Doing Away with the
Conception of Computer-Generated Records as Hearsay, 104 MICH. L. REV. 151, 159
(2005).
140

Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 564 (D. Md. 2007); see United
States v. Khorozian, 333 F.3d 498, 506 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that a fax header was
not a statement and thus not hearsay because it was created by a machine).
141

See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) advisory committee’s note (“If the significance of an offered
statement lies solely in the fact that it was made, no issue is raised as to the truth of
anything asserted, and the statement is not hearsay.”).
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because they are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted.142
Obviously, one must consider the purpose of offering evidence in the
hearsay analysis, because evidence may be admissible for one purpose but
inadmissible for another.143
4. Inadmissibility
[51] Generally, hearsay is inadmissible.144 “The hearsay rule excludes
such evidence because it possesses testimonial dangers of perception,
memory, sincerity, and ambiguity that cannot be tested through oath and
cross-examination.”145
B. Hearsay Exclusions
[52] By express exclusion under the Federal Rules of Evidence, certain
prior statements by a witness and certain admissions by a party-opponent
are not hearsay.146 Courts often apply this latter exclusion, for admissions
of a party-opponent, to electronic evidence.147 “Given the near universal
142

See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 567 n.50 (“A verbal act is an utterance of an operative
fact that gives rise to legal consequences. Verbal acts, also known as statements of legal
consequence, are not hearsay, because the statement is admitted merely to show that it
was actually made, not to prove the truth of what was asserted in it.”); see, e.g.,
Transportes Aereos Pegaso, S.A. v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 518,
530 (D. Del. 2009) (holding that hearsay evidence of a declarant soliciting a bride was a
verbal act and thus fell outside of the hearsay rule); Banks v. State, 608 A.2d 1249, 1254
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (noting that examples of verbal acts include language in will
bequests, offer and acceptance, and libel or slander).
143

See, e.g., United States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that
an e-mail between the defendant and a co-worker was not hearsay because it was not
offered to prove the truth of the statements contained in the e-mail but instead to
demonstrate that a relationship between the two existed).
144

See FED. R. EVID. 802.

145

RICE, supra note 136, at 262.

146

See FED. R. EVID. 801(d).

147

See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 568; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 2d 966, 973 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that e-mails sent by corporate
employees were admissible as admissions by a party’s agent under Rule 801(d)(2)).
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use of electronic means of communication, it is not surprising that
statements contained in electronically made or stored evidence often have
been found to qualify as admissions by a party opponent if offered against
that party.”148
C. Hearsay Exceptions
[53] While the hearsay rule may operate to exclude a vast array of
evidence, the numerous and expansive exceptions to the rule operate to
include more than the rule excludes.149 Among these exceptions are Rules
803 and 804 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which list twenty-eight
exceptions to the hearsay rule.150 In addition, Rule 807 provides a residual
exception for statements bearing “circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness.”151 If a statement falls under one of these exceptions, the
content of the proffered evidence is admissible for its truth.152 The
following hearsay exceptions are most commonly used when dealing with
electronic evidence.
1. Present Sense Impression
[54] “A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made
while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately
thereafter” is not excluded by the hearsay rule, regardless of whether the
declarant is available to testify at the trial or hearing.153
Contemporaneousness is the key to this exception; such statements are
considered trustworthy because the declarant simultaneously perceives the

148

Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 568 (citations omitted); see also MGM Studios, 454 F. Supp.
2d at 973.
149

See generally FED. R. EVID. 803; FED. R. EVID. 804.

150

See generally FED. R. EVID. 803; FED. R. EVID. 804.

151

FED. R. EVID. 807.

152

FED R. EVID. 801(c).

153

FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
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event and makes a statement concerning the event, thereby minimizing the
dangers of poor memory or insincerity.154
[55] Statements made in an e-mail or a human-generated but computerstored record may qualify as a present sense impression in the same way
as a more traditional letter or hardcopy record.155 Moreover, though they
have no close analogue in the non-electronic world, social networking
posts assemble the present sense impressions of millions upon millions of
users.156
2. Excited Utterance
[56] “A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while
the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or
condition” also survives the hearsay rule, regardless of whether the
declarant is available to testify at the trial or hearing.157 The Lorraine
court noted that “[t]he theory behind [this] exception is that perception of
a startling or exciting event produces in the declarant an emotional state
that reduces the likelihood that the description of the event while under
this emotional state will be inaccurate or purposely misstated.”158
Therefore, e-mails, human-created but computer-stored records, and social
154

See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note.

155

See United States v. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. 90, 99 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding that an email from the defendant’s co-worker describing a conversation with the defendant was
admissible as a present sense impression because it was prepared shortly after the
conversation). But see State v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV A. 98-1233(CKK), 2002 WL
649951, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 2002) (finding that an e-mail discussing events from days
prior was not admissible under the present sense impression exception because the e-mail
was not composed while the declarant was perceiving an event or immediately
thereafter).
156

See Bass v. Miss Porter’s Sch., No. 3:08cv1807 (JBA), 2009 WL 3724968, at *1 (D.
Conn. Oct. 27, 2009) (“Facebook usage depicts a snapshot of the user’s relationships and
state of mind at the time of the content’s posting.”).
157

FED. R. EVID. 803(2).

158

Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 569 (D. Md. 2007) (citing FED. R.
EVID. 803(2)).
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media postings can all constitute excited utterances so long as they are
created under the “stress of excitement” caused by a startling event or
condition.159
3. Then Existing State of Mind or Condition
[57] The Federal Rules of Evidence also exclude statements by
declarants concerning their state of mind or condition from the hearsay
exception.160 Rule 803(3) provides for the admissibility of:
[a] statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind,
emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent,
plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily
health), but not including a statement of memory or belief
to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to
the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of
declarant's will.161
[58] Like the present sense impression exclusion listed in Rule 803(1),
contemporaneousness is key to this exception.162 As the Lorraine court
noted, this exception:
has been used to prove a wide variety of matters, including
the reason why the declarant would not deal with a supplier
or dealer, motive, competency, ill-will, . . . lack of intent to
defraud, willingness to engage in criminal conduct, the

159

See Ferber, 966 F. Supp. at 99 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“An excited
utterance must be made under the ‘stress of excitement,’ and any amount of time that
passes between the exciting event and the statement will remove the declarant from the
stress of the situation.”).
160

FED R. EVID. 803(3).

161

Id. These statements are excluded from the hearsay rule regardless of whether the
declarant is available to testify at the trial or hearing. Id.
162

Fed. R. Evid. 803(3) advisory committee’s note (explaining that Rule 803 is
essentially the same as Rule 801).

31

Richmond Journal of Law and Technology

Vol. XVII, Issue 2

victim’s state of mind in an extortion case, and confusion
or secondary meaning in a trademark infringement case.163
The exception is particularly useful in admitting e-mails, which, due to the
seeming informality of the medium, often contain remarkably candid
expressions of the writer’s state of mind.164 Social networking websites
are also littered with expressions of their users’ states of mind.165
4. Business Records
[59] “[M]emorand[a], report[s], record[s], or data compilation[s] . . .
made at or near the time [of an event] by, a person with knowledge” are
excepted from the hearsay rule “if kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that
business [to keep such records].”166 If a custodian or qualified witness
demonstrates these requirements through his testimony, the evidence may
be admitted.167 This business records exception is often analyzed in
conjunction with Rule 902(11) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which

163

Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 570 (citation omitted).

164

See id. at 554 (“Perhaps because of the spontaneity and informality of e-mail, people
tend to reveal more of themselves, for better or worse, than in other more deliberative
forms of written communication. For that reason, e-mail evidence often figures
prominently in cases where state of mind, motive and intent must be proved. Indeed, it is
not unusual to see a case consisting almost entirely of e-mail evidence.”).
165

See Susan W. Brenner, Internet Law in the Courts, 13 J. INTERNET L. 16, 18 (2009).

166

FED. R. EVID. 803(6).

167

Id.; see also Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Lozen Int’l, LLC, 285 F.3d 808, 819 (9th Cir.
2002) (affirming the trial court’s admission of bills of lading under the business records
exception after the custodian stated that the company kept the records in the ordinary
course of business); United States v. Catabran, 836 F.2d 453, 457 (9th Cir. 1988)
(holding that the trial court properly admitted computer printouts under the business
records exception after the custodian provided sufficient foundation); United States v.
Vela, 673 F.2d 86, 89-90 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that telephone records were properly
admitted as a business record because the custodian described how the records were
prepared and maintained).
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provides for the authentication of certified domestic records of regularlyconducted business activities without extrinsic evidence.168
[60] Business records are viewed as trustworthy, and therefore excepted
from the hearsay rule, because they are kept by trained record keepers and
regularly checked for accuracy.169 However, the business records
exception is not limited to records made and kept by a “business.” Rather
the records of government agencies,170 private clubs,171 and individual
households172 may all qualify under the exception.
[61] It has been noted that “[t]he business record exception is one of the
hearsay exceptions most discussed by courts when ruling on the
admissibility of electronic evidence.”173 E-mails174 and computer-stored
168

See supra Part IV.C.3 (discussing self-authentication under Rule 902(11)).

169

See State v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV A. 98-1233(CKK), 2002 WL 649951, at *2
(D.D.C. Apr. 12, 2002) (citation omitted).
170

See, e.g., United States v. Szehinskyj, 104 F. Supp. 2d 480, 491-92 (E.D. Pa. 2000)
(admitting documents of the German government concerning the regulation of
concentration camps under the business records exception because the records outlined
the camps operations).
171

See, e.g., Keogh v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 713 F.2d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1983)
(holding that the private diary of country club employee was admissible under the
business records exception and rejecting the argument that the exception applies solely to
commercial businesses).
172

See, e.g., United States v. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. 90, 98-99 (stating that if it were
common household practice to compose e-mails following significant telephone
conversations, such e-mails would be admissible under the business records exception).
173

Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 572 (D. Md. 2007).

174

See Pierre v. RBC Liberty Life Ins., No. 05-1042-C, 2007 WL 2071829, at *2 (M.D.
La. July 13, 2007) (finding that e-mails fell within Rule 803(6) because they “were
prepared by . . . employees during the ordinary course of business”); DirecTV, Inc. v.
Murray, 307 F. Supp. 2d 764, 772-73 (D.S.C. 2004) (finding that sales records contained
in e-mails were admissible under the business records exception when sales orders were
regularly received via e-mail and the e-mails were retained as records of each order);
Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 348 F. Supp. 2d 698, 706 (E.D. Va. 2004) (noting
that e-mails can qualify as business records). But see Microsoft, 2002 WL 649951, at *2
(declining to admit e-mails under the business records exception because there was a
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and computer-generated records175 may qualify under the business records
exception to the hearsay rule, provided that they meet the requirements set
forth in Rule 803(6).176
5. Public Records
[62]

Also exempt from the hearsay rule are:
[r]ecords, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any
form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the
activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed
pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there
was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases
matters observed by police officers and other law
enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and
proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases,
factual findings resulting from an investigation made
pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of
information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.177

[63] Public records are viewed as trustworthy because public officials
are expected to perform their duties appropriately, but are unlikely to
remember the details of those activities independent of the record

“complete lack of information regarding the practice of composition and maintenance of
[the] e-mails”); Ferber, 966 F. Supp. at 99 (declining to admit e-mails under the business
records exception because the author of the e-mails “was under no business duty to make
and maintain” such e-mails).
175

See United States v. Cestnik, 36 F.3d 904, 909-10 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that
computer-generated money transfer records were admissible under the business records
exception to the hearsay rule because the records were kept according to a standard
procedure and in the normal course of business).
176

See generally FED. R. EVID. 803(6).

177

FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
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created.178 Because public records are deemed to have a higher degree of
accuracy than business records, the proponent of a public record typically
is not required to provide foundational testimony to demonstrate a public
record’s admissibility, whereas, to qualify under the business records
exception, the proponent must adduce testimony from the custodian of the
records or an otherwise qualified witness.179
[64] Furthermore, “[p]ublic records and government documents are
generally considered ‘not to be subject to reasonable dispute.’ This
includes public records and government documents available from reliable
sources on the Internet.”180 It does not appear “that any appellate court
has passed definitively upon the admissibility as evidence of public
records printed from a government website. . . . Trial courts have,
however, found such copies admissible.”181 Courts have applied the
public records exception to the hearsay rule to admit information
displayed on the websites of the United States Census Bureau182 and the
United States Postal Service.183 In addition, at least one court applied this
exception to admit the public record of a foreign government.184 The
178

See FED. R. EVID. 803(8) advisory committee’s note (citing Wong Wing Foo v.
McGrath, 196 F.2d 120 (9th Cir. 1952)).
179

Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 574 (D. Md. 2007); see United
States v. Doyle, 130 F.3d 523, 546 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that foundation witnesses are
not required under Rule 803(8)).
180

United States ex rel. Dingle v. Bioport Corp., 270 F. Supp. 2d 968, 972 (W.D. Mich.
2003) (citation omitted).
181

Bernstein v. City of New York, No. 28863/04, 2007 WL 283072, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Feb. 1, 2007) (citation omitted).
182

See U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., No.
Civ.A. 03-1605, 2004 WL 2347559, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2004) (holding that a table
of information compiled by the United States Census Bureau and printed from the Census
Bureau’s website was admissible as a public record under Rule 803(8)).
183

See Chapman v. S.F. Newspaper Agency, No. C 01-02305 CRB, 2002 WL 31119944,
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2002) (holding that a printout of a page from the United States
Postal Service website was admissible as a public record under Rule 803(8)(A)).
184

See United States v. New-Form Mfg. Co., 277 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1326 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2003) (holding that a record created from information available on the official website of
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exception has also been applied to e-mails that otherwise met the
requirements of Rule 803(8).185
6. Market Reports and Commercial Publications
[65] The hearsay rule does not preclude the admission of “[m]arket
quotations, tabulations, lists, directories, or other published compilations,
generally used and relied upon by the public or by persons in particular
occupations.”186 Such information is viewed as trustworthy, and worthy
of hearsay exception, because of the public’s reliance on the material,
which incentivizes the compiler of the information to provide accurate
information.187
[66] Nearly all of the market reports and commercial publications
contemplated by this exception to the hearsay rule are now available on
the Internet.188 Thus, whereas twenty years ago a court might have been
asked to apply this exception to the National Automobile Dealers
Association (NADA) “Blue Book,” which provides value information for
new and used motor vehicles, the proponent of such evidence is now more
likely to ask the court to admit value information from the NADA or

the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada was admissible under Rule
803(17)).
185

See Lester v. Natsios, 290 F. Supp. 2d 11, 26 (D.D.C. 2003) (finding that e-mails
regarding a job vacancy at a government agency were admissible as public records under
Rule 803(8)).
186

FED. R. EVID. 803(17).

187

FED. R. EVID. 803(17) advisory committee’s note.

188

Cf. United States ex rel. Dingle v. Bioport Corp., 270 F. Supp. 2d 968, 972 (W.D.
Mich. 2003).
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Kelley’s websites.189 Both have been admitted to demonstrate the value of
a motor vehicle.190
VI. PROVING THE CONTENT OF ELECTRONIC WRITINGS,
RECORDINGS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS
A. Original Document Rule and Other Methods of Proving Contents
[67] The Federal Rules of Evidence state that “[t]o prove the content of
a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or
photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by
Act of Congress.”191 For data maintained on “a computer or similar
device, any printout or other output readable by sight, shown to reflect the
data accurately, is an ‘original.’”192 “A duplicate is admissible to the same
extent as an original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the
authenticity of the original or (2) in the circumstances it would be unfair to
admit the duplicate in lieu of the original.”193
[68] If the original is lost or destroyed (unless destroyed by the
proponent of the evidence in bad faith), not obtainable by judicial practice,
or in the possession of the proponent’s opponent, the original is not
required and the proponent may seek to admit other “secondary” evidence
of the content of the writing, recording, or photograph.194 Further, the
189

See generally State v. Erickstad, 620 N.W.2d 136, 145 (N.D. 2000); see also IrbyGreene v. M.O.R., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 630, 636 n.22 (E.D. Va. 2000) (indicating the
court’s reliance on the Kelley Blue Book Internet website for valuation of two vehicles).
190

See Hess v. Riedel-Hess, 794 N.E.2d 96, 103 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the
NADA appraisal guide printed from NADAguides.com was admissible pursuant to Ohio
Rule of Evidence 803(17)); Erickstad, 620 N.W.2d at 145-46 (holding that the valuation
information for a pickup truck found on the Kelley Blue Book website was admissible).
191

FED. R. EVID. 1002.

192

FED. R. EVID. 1001(3).

193

FED. R. EVID. 1003.

194

See FED. R. EVID. 1004.
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proponent need not account for the missing original if the testimony or
written admission of his opponent proves the content of the record.195
Finally, if writings, recordings, or photographs are voluminous, their
contents may be presented via summary, chart or calculation.196 In that
case, the original writings, recordings, or photographs, or duplicates
thereof, must be made available for examination or copying, or both, by
other parties to the litigation.
B. Application to Electronic Evidence
[69] Electronic evidence consists entirely of writings, recordings, and
photographs.197 Accordingly, the original document rule applies whenever
a party attempts to prove the contents of the electronic evidence.198
E-mails, text messages, chat room dialogue, and other electronic records
all qualify as writings because they consist of letters, words, or numbers
set down by mechanical or electronic recording, or other forms of data
compilation.199 Due to “the myriad ways that electronic records may be
deleted, lost as a result of system malfunctions, purged as a result of
routine electronic records management software (such as the automatic
deletion of e-mail after a set period of time) or otherwise unavailable,”200

195

See FED. R. EVID. 1007.

196

FED. R. EVID. 1006.

197

See FED. R. EVID. 1001(1).

198

See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co, 241 F.R.D. 534, 578 (D. Md. 2007).

199

See State v. Espiritu, 176 P.3d 885, 892 (Haw. 2008) (admitting printouts of text
messages received by the victim and holding that the original text messages were not
required under an exception to the original writing rule, which excuses the production of
an original or duplicate if the original was lost or destroyed absent bad faith on the part of
the proponent); Adams v. State, 117 P.3d 1210, 1218 (Wy. 2005) (admitting computer
printouts of a chat room dialogue between the defendant and a police officer where “[t]he
State’s witness testified that the chat log exhibits were exact copies of the communication
between the parties contained on the computer and thus, they were either appropriate
computer ‘originals’ or duplicates which were properly authenticated.”).
200

Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 580.
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proponents must often resort to secondary evidence to prove their
contents.201
VII. CONCLUSION
[70] Though certain issues, such as authentication, may be more
complicated in the context of electronic evidence, traditional evidentiary
principles can be consistently adapted to address questions regarding the
admissibility of electronic evidence. Guided by the Lorraine model and
the cases cited in this article, the proponent of electronic evidence should
have little difficulty successfully moving the admission of his or her
evidence. When all else fails, comparison of the electronic evidence with
its most similar non-electronic analogue will enable a proponent to draw
upon the court’s familiarity with traditional evidentiary principles to
provide comfort in the trustworthiness of the electronic evidence. As one
court has said, “[t]he potentially limitless application of computer
technology to evidentiary questions will continually require legal
adaptation.” 202 That adaptation must necessarily begin with the
proponents of electronic evidence.

201

See Espiritu, 176 P.3d at 893 (admitting secondary evidence of the content of text
messages where the witness no longer had the text messages at issue because she no
longer had the cellular telephone or cellular telephone service from the provider through
which she had received the messages); see also United States v. Hunter, 266 F. App’x
619, 621-22 (9th Cir. 2008) (admitting excerpts of a series of text messages as summaries
under Rule 1006 and holding that, “if the defendant objects to the summary of the
evidence, he cannot have the evidence excluded, but instead, can compel the government
to introduce the rest of the incomplete evidence.”).
202

Penny v. Commonwealth, 370 S.E.2d 314, 317 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
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